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Abstract 
For approximately 25 years, the United States was the world’s sole superpower. With 
the emergence of China as a peer competitor on both the economic and military fronts, that 
era has come to an end. The prospect for near-future, industrial-scale, non-nuclear warfare 
can no longer be dismissed. Should that occur, it would be irresponsible to assume that a 
military decision would quickly ensue, therefore industrial (and societal) mobilization would 
be necessary. When considering this type of future, it is natural to look to the most recent 
historical example for guidance, and that would be World War II, in which America’s 
supremely effective industrial mobilization created the well-known “arsenal of democracy” 
that the enemy was not able to counter.  
In this paper, we propose that while the World War II story is instructive, the run-up 
to World War I in which America’s industrial mobilization was far less effective, should not be 
ignored. This paper takes an introductory look at the failure of U.S. industrial mobilization in 
World War I, focusing on the case of shipbuilding. We review similarities and contrasts to 
today’s situation and suggest courses of action to reduce the likelihood of a similar outcome 
in the future. 
Introduction 
The total collapse of the Soviet Union in 1991, which took the West by surprise, 
thrust the United States into a new and unexpected role as the world’s sole superpower 
(Department of State, 2001–2009). The U.S. Navy suddenly exercised uncontested control 
of the high seas. Absent a high-end military threat, defense spending (including naval 
construction) was curtailed during the balance of the 1990s as resources were shifted to 
serve economic rather than military objectives. In that manner the American people looked 
forward to reaping a peace dividend. As the ex-Soviet fleet quickly deteriorated, the U.S. 
Navy’s principal role was re-directed toward projecting influence and power ashore. 
Following the attacks of September 11, 2001, the prospect of a peace dividend vanished as 
the military budget grew. But military operations in the post-911 era were focused on land 
warfare, and naval ship production rates did not expand appreciably. There was little 
urgency to developing plans to mobilize the shipbuilding industry in response to aggression 
from enemy naval forces capable of inflicting severe losses at sea.  
Acquisition Research Program: 
Creating Synergy for Informed Change - 253 - 
NAVAL Postgraduate School 
This frame of mind ended in the mid- to late-2010s. The current geopolitical 
environment has become characterized by “overt challenges to the free and open 
international order and the re-emergence of long-term, strategic competition between 
nations” (DoD, 2018). The result is a renewed potential for non-nuclear, industrial-scale war. 
If such a war were to break out against a peer-level enemy or against an alliance of multiple 
peer-level enemies, historical precedent suggests that demands on the U.S. Navy could 
quickly ratchet up.  
The most recent major mobilization of the shipbuilding industry occurred prior to and 
during World War II. The World War II shipbuilding effort encompassed every type of naval 
and merchant ship, plus emergent types not envisioned prior to hostilities. The U.S. 
economy, directed and controlled by the State, performed brilliantly as described in an 
extensive literature that includes several recent book-length treatments (e.g., Wilson, 2016; 
Baime, 2015, & Herman, 2012) along with older classics such as Lane (1951), a standard 
text on the Emergency Shipbuilding Program of the Second World War.  
The rapid and effective mobilization and expansion of war production (including 
shipbuilding) in World War II is a popular story due in part to its success, which was 
unprecedented. But the World War II effort was not original. It was preceded by a very 
similar push to mobilize U.S. industry, with a major focus on shipbuilding, in World War I. 
Responsible preparation for a future industrial-scale, non-nuclear war involving naval 
combat and trans-ocean supply lines would require an understanding of the World War I 
experience.  
Shipping and Shipbuilding Actions Prior to U.S. Entry into the War 
Prior to World War I, the world’s dominant shipbuilder was Great Britain (see, for 
example, Stott, 2017).1 At the early stages of the war, the British believed that the key 
maritime asset needed to defeat Germany was a large battle fleet, so naval construction 
was prioritized over merchant shipbuilding. Consequently, British commercial shipping 
deliveries actually dropped; the merchant ship tonnage delivered in 1915–1916 was only 
one third of that delivered in 1913–1914. French industry was unable to respond as 
resources were fully occupied in ground fighting. U.S. shipyards, which had been depressed 
prior to the war, responded and were quickly filled with new orders (Williams, 1989, pp. 38–
41).  
From 1915 to 1916, German U-boat action took a heavy toll as Germany attempted 
to counter-blockade Great Britain. In 1916 German submarines sunk one of four ships 
bound for the U.K. and continental Europe (Hutchins, 1948, p. 52). “By the spring of 1916, 
the amount of tonnage sunk each month by German U-Boats began to overtake the amount 
of new tonnage delivered” (Williams, 1989, p. 41). The most pressing need now was for 
cargo-carrying merchant ships. The British revised their industrial priorities; however, it was 
not enough. U.S. shipbuilding was needed to plug the gap.  
The Shipping Act of 1916 established a new U.S. Shipping Board that was 
empowered and capitalized to form a subsidiary corporation for the purpose of building and 
                                                
 
 
1 Great Britain led the development of the steel shipbuilding industry, but its global 
market declined “from over 80% in the 1890s to zero by the end of the 1980s” (Stott, 2017). 
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operating merchant vessels. The Naval Act of 1916 provided for naval construction to be 
ramped up. Its general objective was to build a powerful battle fleet; motivated by battleship 
and battlecruiser action in the Battle of Jutland (May 31–June 1, 1916). Naval ships were 
constructed at the Navy yards and at the large, pre-existing private-sector shipyards, such 
as New York Shipbuilding (Camden, NJ), Newport News, Fore River, Union Iron Works, 
Bath Iron Works, William Cramp & Son, and Electric Boat.  
The Three Sectors of the Shipbuilding Industry (New Construction) 
The United States declared war on Germany on April 6, 1917, and this spurred 
industrial mobilization to build warships and merchant ships. The ship new construction 
industrial base comprised three sectors:  
1. Navy yards 
2. Existing commercial shipyards 
3. Emergency commercial shipyards 
Each had distinct industrial characteristics and business bases. The Navy yards built 
warships, and the existing commercial shipyards built warships and a variety of merchant 
ship types. The emergency shipyards were a special case. Most, including the three largest, 
did not exist prior to the war. These emergency shipyards were “pop-up” facilities urgently 
constructed with government funding to build merchant ships quickly to overbalance the 
attrition from the German submarine campaign.  
Naval Construction 
Upon the entry of the United States into the war, naval shipbuilding underwent a 
complete change of plan in terms of both the quantity ordered and the mix of ship types. 
This is shown in Table 1, which traces U.S. naval ship production from shortly before the 
turn of the 20th century through World War I.  
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Table 1: Naval Vessels Delivered by Year, U.S., 1898–1922 
(Smith & Brown, 1948, pp. 115–117) 
 
Note. Other types include minelayers, minesweepers, ammunition ships, fuel ships, tenders, monitors, and others. 
 
Prior to World War I, the European great powers plus the United States and Japan 
had engaged in a naval arms race prominently geared towards fleet operations and 
featuring battleships and cruisers. Unexpectedly for all belligerents, World War I naval 
combat followed a different course. Table 1 shows that the U.S. Navy shipbuilding plan was 
revamped to prioritize destroyers and submarines rather than capital ships, but the re-
orientation and the ramp-up did not happen quickly enough. While the armistice was signed 
in 1918, peak output was not reached until 1919.  
The major naval fighting ships (battleships, destroyers, and submarines) were built at 
a variety of shipyards including all three types, that is, Navy yards, existing private sector 
yards, and a new emergency yard, as shown in Table 2. The emergency shipyard that was 
purpose-built for destroyer production was the Navy-owned, Bethlehem Shipbuilding 
Corporation-operated facility at Squantum, MA. That yard followed the concept of the 
merchant ship emergency yards and was designed to build a single ship-type (destroyers) in 
large numbers. The shipbuilding supplier industries required rapid expansion along with the 
shipyards. For example, in conjunction with the construction of the new Squantum shipyard, 
the Navy also built a new boiler shop in Providence, RI, and a turbine shop in Buffalo, NY. 
The Navy financed facilities expansion at other existing shipyards, including the Newport 
News shipyard and the New York Shipbuilding Corporation yard in Camden, NJ, along with 
expansions to other critical suppliers such as Erie Forge (DoN, 1921). 
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Table 2: Shipyards That Built Major Warship Types From 1913 to 1922 
(Smith & Brown, 1948, p. 132) 
 
Note. Shown are shipyards that built battleships, destroyers, and submarines, i.e., the principal fighting ships. No cruisers were 
built in this period.  
Merchant Ship Construction 
The U.S. shipbuilding industry had become very active following the 1914 outbreak 
of the war, as the British shipyards were filled to capacity with orders. On April 16, 1917, 10 
days after the declaration of war on Germany, the U.S. Shipping Board created the 
Emergency Fleet Corporation; all of the shares were held by the Shipping Board. The 
Shipping Board was essentially regulative, with the Emergency Fleet Corporation being its 
operational arm. The initial organization of the Shipping Board was badly flawed, leading to 
unresolvable technical and managerial disputes at the top level. In late July 1917, senior 
leadership was replaced with a more effective line-up and the World War I shipbuilding 
program got under way in earnest. But the political and bureaucratic paralysis cost the 
program four months that proved impossible to recover.  
On July 11, 1917, under its new and more energetic leadership, the Emergency Fleet 
Corporation took control of the U.S. shipping and shipbuilding industries. It requisitioned all 
431 steel merchant ships under construction in U.S. shipyards, totaling 3,068,431 
deadweight tons (Hutchins, 1948). This was not enough however, and what followed was 
“the greatest flood of ship orders in American history. The task was indeed the largest 
shipbuilding effort in the world’s history up to that time” (Hutchins, 1948, p. 52). It is worth 
quoting Hutchins at length here: 
In 1917, before the entry of the United States into the war, the 
shipbuilding industry had already grown to forty-two yards with 154 ways 
for steel ships. … Before 1914, about 75 per cent of the country’s shipyard 
capacity was normally engaged in naval work. By 1919, however, the 
capacity had risen to seventy-two steel shipyards with 461 ways. … The 
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yards were then engaged in the construction of more commercial than 
naval tonnage.2 (Smith & Brown, 1948) 
The need far exceeded the capacity of the existing shipbuilding industry.3 The 
construction of new emergency shipyards and the enlargement of existing ones was 
necessary. Hurley (1927) described the situation as follows:4 
Originally it was supposed that the main function of the Fleet 
Corporation would be that of developing designs and placing contracts for 
ships. But all the yards were either busy in completing for the Fleet 
Corporation the 431 hulls which we had commandeered, or were clogged 
with orders for the Navy. The shipyard owners, found that they could not 
control the supply of either material or labor. Hence the Fleet Corporation 
had to step in and manage the yards. Entirely new yards had to be built, at 
an expense so huge that it could not be defrayed by private companies. In 
the end the Fleet Corporation had to build the yards with government 
money and to act as their banker. 
The Emergency Fleet Corporation contracted for three new large shipyards to be 
built by private-sector firms. The largest was the Hog Island shipyard in Philadelphia.5 This 
facility was owned by the American International Corporation, which also owned the huge, 
modern New York Shipbuilding Corporation yard in Camden, NJ. Hog Island (and the other 
purpose-built yards) built ships to a standard design, employing newly conceived 
prefabrication methods on a massive scale. Hog Island “built 122 ships of 921,000 
deadweight tons between the laying of the first keel … on Feb. 12, 1918 and the completion 
of its last vessel on Jan. 29, 1921, averaging a keel every 5.5 days.” Of those 122 ships, 
110 were of the pre-fabricated standard Hog Island 7,600 dwt freighter. The yard had 50 
slipways but not as many shop facilities as a conventional shipyard, as many parts and 
components were manufactured elsewhere. Peak employment was 30,000. (Hutchins, 
1948, pp. 54–55; Goldberg, 1991, pp. 3–14). See Table 3 for a summary of activity at the 
Emergency Fleet Corporation shipyards.  
  
                                                
 
 
2 Table 10 lists the 70-odd shipyards.  
3 Merchant ships were so desperately needed that the Shipping Board placed orders in 
Japanese and Chinese shipyards (Goldberg, 1991, p. 3). 
4 Edward N. Hurley was appointed chairman of the U.S. Shipping Board in July 1917 as part 
of the USSB’s reorganization.  
5 The others were the Newark shipyard of the Submarine Boat Company and the Bristol, PA, 
yard of the Merchant Shipbuilding Corporation.  
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Table 3: World War I Emergency Shipyards 
(Shipbuildinghistory.com, Tim Colton, accessed Feb. 13, 2019) 
 
Note.  
1. A few of these yards completed a small number of later ships, for example, USSB cancellations that they were able to 
complete for private-sector ship owners.  
2. Dozens of cargo ships were delivered to the French government by various emergency shipyards.  
3. A few additional emergency yards built smaller ships of less than 1,000 gross tons. 
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As seen in Table 3, the Hog Island shipyard achieved a prodigious output. But its first 
ship, the Quistconck, was delivered in December 1918, too late for World War I service.6 
This must have been a colossal frustration at the time, and it is the general theme of the 
World War I merchant and naval shipbuilding effort: technically impressive, far in front of 
shipbuilding thinking elsewhere in the world, but ultimately did not contribute to victory in the 
war. The Hog Island shipyard was promptly closed down and demolished after the last 
delivery in 1921; much of the site is now the Philadelphia airport. However, the effort was a 
valuable dress rehearsal for World War II, in which the same theme of ship manufacturing in 
huge, purpose-built facilities was adopted with much more timeliness.  
The merchant shipbuilding program’s results in Table 3 paralleled those of the naval 
construction program: impressive industrial mobilization, but too late for most of the ships to 
come on line during the war (see Figure 1). This effect was exacerbated in the merchant 
vessel program, as most of the shipyards did not exist before the hostilities, and the largest 
did not exist until after U.S. entry.  
 
 
Figure 1. Gross Tons of Steel Merchant Ships (over 2,000 gt) Delivered 1914–1945 
(Smith & Brown, 1948) 
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Discussion and Recommendations 
The U.S. World War I shipbuilding program was not effective because it started well 
after World War I was underway, and because of poor management in its initial 
stages. World War I began in August 1914, and by the end of that year it was clear that it 
would be a long desperate struggle, yet the United States made few preparations for naval 
construction until the Naval Act of 1916. Seven months later, in April 1917, the United States 
entered the war, and at that point the Emergency Fleet Corporation still had not been 
created.  
The contrast to the World War II experience is stark. A ramp-up in ship orders for 
that war started at the expiration of the naval arms limitation treaties in 1936, three years 
prior to European theatre hostilities. As early as 1939, efforts were initiated to expand 
industrial capacity. During America’s pre-War period (1936–1941), 182 destroyers were 
authorized and 39 were delivered.  
The World War I experience suggests some food for thought in preparation for the 
onset of future industrial-scale, non-nuclear, global war. A few samples are offered in the 
next paragraphs. 
1. Investments in options could increase industrial capacity rapidly. This would include the 
shipbuilding industrial base and the critical supplier base of facilities that take the same 
general timeframe to ramp up as a shipyard. This could include foundries, forges, 
specialty machine shops, and other types of production facilities, and capacity for 
development of software infrastructure for naval and commercial ships. 
2. Merchant marine and merchant shipbuilding policies may be due for a reexamination. In 
past global wars, merchant fleets have been instrumental tools of military strategy. They 
were required to reposition ground forces, their gear, and supplies between overseas 
theatres of war. The U.S. merchant marine has substantially atrophied since World War 
II. U.S. subsidy programs supporting the foreign trading segment of the merchant marine 
have not been funded since the early 1980s.7 Before 1914, approximately 75% of U.S. 
shipbuilding industrial capacity was engaged in Navy new construction. But at the height 
of World War I, after tremendous capacity expansion, there were more merchant ships 
being built than warships even though most of the warships being built were small. In 
World Wars I and II, at the point when the situation was grimmest for the allied powers, 
merchant shipbuilding was by far the #1 priority, not warship construction.  
3. In preparation for high-volume wartime production, creation of detailed designs of 
merchant and naval ship types could be done in advance. If the two world wars are valid 
guidance (not known), then other ship types, including long-lead-time warships, would 
out of necessity be placed at lower priority.8 The corollary would be that those are the 
ship types that would be emphasized in peacetime in the absence of war exigencies.  
                                                
 
 
7 The foreign trading segment of the merchant marine exists outside of the Jones Act 
legislative environment. Historically it was supported via mechanisms including subsidies and cargo 
preference programs (Gibson & Donovan, 2000). 
8 World War I lasted less than 4 ½ years (including prior to U.S. involvement), so even for the 
European belligerents, no ships that took longer than that to build were able to be used during the 
war.  
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4. Prototype construction of some of those ship designs to work out design issues, 
production issues, and gain feedback from the operator for design mods may be an 
effective way to smooth the path to wartime volume production. For effective designs, it 
may be advantageous to store jigs and other critical tooling.  
5. Ship design flexibility may be at a premium at the outset of a new industrial-scale 
conflict, due to the impossibility of accurately predicting the nature of future naval 
combat. In World War I, not only was the naval surface combatant production priority 
changed from capital ships to destroyers, the originally intended fleet combat role of the 
destroyers (e.g., torpedo attacks on enemy capital ships) never materialized. Instead, 
they were pressed into service convoying merchant vessels and conducting the world’s 
first antisubmarine warfare campaign (Gardiner, 1985).  
Conclusion  
The industrial mobilization experience of the United States in World War II has been 
described and discussed in an extensive literature and is well known. One reason is that it is 
an uplifting story, and in significant ways it embodied the ideals upon which the best in 
American civilization is based. It was as the “arsenal of democracy” that America made, 
arguably, its most irreplaceable contribution to allied victory. A critical lynchpin of that effort 
was shipbuilding, where the result was achieved through the voluntary, dedicated labor of 
an unprecedented cross section of American society (including women and minorities) who 
were effectively mobilized with a common goal of building merchant ships to counter the 
effects of German submarine warfare.  
In World War I, both the need and the means were almost the same, and yet the 
result was disappointing, even though the United States responded in a spectacular fashion, 
temporarily becoming the largest shipbuilding nation in the world, and the ships built during 
the World War I program “composed the great bulk of the American merchant marine until 
the construction program of World War II had effect” (Hutchins, 1948, p. 53). In this paper 
we have described the actions taken and that the results were too late to have as much 
effect as they could have had.  
For an additional cautionary conclusion, we now take a big-picture look. We observe 
that the industrial mobilization outcome in the 1941–1945 war was fully informed by the 
1917–1918 experience. For World War II, “the characteristics of that earlier period were … 
again duplicated” (Hutchins, 1948, p. 57). In terms of industrial base strategy, industrial 
organization, and manufacturing technology, World War I served almost as a dress 
rehearsal for World War II. In a potential 21st century non-nuclear World War III, could the 
United States update the successful World War II script to achieve victory? Not likely, as too 
many variables (industrial, economic, geopolitical) have undergone fundamental change 
since 1945. Which brings us back to the World War I predicament: mobilizing the industrial 
base in a new economic environment, for a new type of war.  
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